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Abstract
The core aim of this study is to examine the relationship between corporate governance and the
firm performance of selected Ethiopian insurance firms. To achieve the objectives of the study,
the data were collected from a sample of 10 insurance companies for the financial year covering
2008 to 2012. Variables such as board size, board composition, firm size, board gender diversity
and leverage was considered as predictors of the firm performance that was measured
employing the return on equity (ROE). Secondary data were collected using documentary
information from company annual financial statements and the data were analyzed using a panel
data regression analysis by using STATA 11.
The regression result shows that board gender diversity, firm size and leverage positively
influence the financial performance of selected insurance firms in Ethiopia and they are
significant based on return on equity (ROE); whereas board size and board composition have
statistically insignificant impact on financial performance, but board size influence negatively
and board composition influence positively the financial performance of selected insurance firms
in Ethiopia. The study recommended that the insurance industries encourage women to participate in
corporate top position or in the board of directors to enhance financial performance and attention
should be given to increase total assets of the insurance firms to improve financial performance.
Key words: corporate governance, board size, board composition, firm size, board gender
diversity, leverage, financial performance.
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CHAPTER ONE
INTRODUCTION
1.1 Background of the Study
Corporate governance is the relationship among shareholders, board of directors and the top
management in determining the direction and performance of the corporation. It includes the
relationship among the many players involved (the stakeholders) and the goals for which the
corporation is governed (Kim & Rasiah, 2010). Companies have long known that good
governance generates investor goodwill and confidence. Corporate governance can be
considerd as an environment of trust, ethics, moral value and confidence- as a systematic
effort of all the constituent parts - that is the stakeholders, including government, the general
puplic, professional service providers, and the corporate sectors. The growing demand for
capital and other resources from businesses has increased the importance of corporate
governance around the world. Raising finance and maintaining profitability and liquidity can
be difficult for the companies. It is even harder for those companies that are operating in less
developed countries where capital markets and financial institutions are not fully established
(McGee, 2009). Corporate governance deals not only with the internal management of the
firms, but is also concerned about a firm's relationship with its suppliers, customers, and
other stakeholders.
Corporate governance plays a major role in macroeconomic stability; provide the
appropriate environment for economic growth as well as society welfare, therefore
international institutions give major attention and concerns to this issue at the level of macro
and micro aspects. It is a set of relationships between a company's management, its board,
its shareholders, and other stakeholders and also provides the structure through which the
objectives of the company are set, and the means of attaining those objectives and
monitoring performance are determined. Good corporate governance should provide proper
incentives for the board and management to pursue objectives that are in the interests of the
company and shareholders and should facilitate effective monitoring, thereby encouraging
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The governance system is a combination of processes, customs, policies, laws and
institutions in a country by which public listed companies are directed and controlled, not
only to maximize the wealth of shareholders but to achieve other corporate objectives of the
company as well. It also deals with the accountability of the individuals through a
mechanism which reduces the principal-agent problem in the organization. The agency
problem allows manager to extract more private benefits and the firm ultimately performs
worse. Therefore, firms needed to improved corporate governance issues in order to survive
for long term growth and survival. A system of good corporate governance can occur in the
organization by putting the balance between the ownership and control and also among the
interests of stakeholders of the firm. This approach might be helpful in developing the
positive attitude among the manager and shareholders and reduces the agency problems in
the firms. Moreover, this is a principal agent problem where the shareholders are the
principal and the chief executive officer (CEO) is the agent. The principal/agent problems
which are inherent in the structure of large companies: it arising between management and
the shareholders as a class; between majority shareholders and minority shareholders; and
between the controllers of the company (whether managers or majority shareholders) and
non-shareholder stakeholders. Within a particular company the first two sets of problem are
mutually exclusive (at least at anyone point in time) and which predominates depends upon
the structure of shareholdings. Where shareholdings are dispersed, the principal/agent
problem which emerges is that between shareholders as a class and the management of the
company (Paul, 2000).
The board of directors is charged with oversight of management on behalf of shareholders.
Agency theorists argue that in order to protect the interests of shareholders, the board of
directors must assume an effective oversight function. It is assumed that board performance
of its monitoring duties is influenced by the effectiveness of the board, which in turn is
influenced by factors such as board composition and quality, size of board, duality of chief
executive officer, board diversity, information asymmetries and board culture (Brennan,
2006).
Corporate governance is affected by the relationships among participants in the governance
system. Controlling shareholders, which may be individuals, family holdings, bloc alliances,
or other corporations acting through a holding company or cross shareholdings, can
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significantly influence corporate behavior. As owners of equity, institutional investors are
increasingly demanding a voice in corporate governance in some markets. Individual
shareholders usually do not seek to exercise governance rights but may be highly concerned
about obtaining fair treatment from controlling shareholders and management. Creditors
play an important role in a number of governance systems and can serve as external
monitors over corporate performance. Employees and other stakeholders play an important
role in contributing to the long-term success and performance of the corporation, while
governments establish the overall institutional and legal framework for corporate
governance. The role of each of these participants and their interactions vary widely among
OECD countries and among non- OECD countries as well. These relationships are subject,
in part, to law and regulation and, in part, to voluntary adaptation and, most importantly, to
market forces (OECD, 2004).
A strong and balanced board of directors is necessary as a supervising body for the executive
management of a company with dispersed ownership. Hussein (2012), writing on the
overview of corporate governance standards states that Ethiopia's company law does not
have adequate legislative provisions on governance issues related to the separation of
supervision and management responsibilities, and on the composition, independence and
remuneration of board of directors in share companies.
The establishments of the Private Sector Development Hub (PSD-HUB) under the Addis
Ababa Chamber of Commerce and Sectoral Associations with the financial support from
SIDA enables projects in the development of Corporate Governance in Ethiopia. After the
establishment of corporate Governance in Ethiopia in 2007, stakeholders draw a road map; a
framework that advocate for strong leadership in order for the business community to
actively participate and interact for actively executing Corporate Governance in different
companies (Addis Abeba Chamber of Commerce, 2014).
1.2 Statements of the problem
Corporate governance mechanism is an important method for companies agency cost and
helps improve performance. Given the importance of corporate governance, several studies
have been conducted in developed countries on the relationship between corporate
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governance mechanisms and firms' financial performance and found mixed results (positive
and negative impact) (See for example Bauer, et aI., 2008; Ibrahim, et aI., 2010; Lupu &
Nichitean, 2011). However, most of the prior studies have been undertaken on large firms
operating within well organized corporate governance mechanisms in developed economic
system. Therefore, it is difficult to generalize the same result from the findings of those
studies for relatively small size Ethiopian insurance companies' governance mechanisms.
Furthermore, Ethiopia's corporate governance landscapes are embedded in a setting that
differs from a western context in several ways (Dessalegn & Mengistu, 2011). Ethiopian
insurance companies' corporate governance is characterized by the absence of an organized
share market and the country has different regulations, practices, and economic features
which needs to conduct a separate study (cited by Yenesew, 2012).
In Ethiopia so far no study appears to have been made that specifically address the effect of
corporate governance and firm performance on insurance industry. Hussein, (2012) on the
overview of corporate governance standards states that Ethiopia's "company law does not
have adequate legislative provisions on governance issues related to the separation of
supervision and management responsibilities, and on the composition, independence and
remuneration of board of directors in share companies". This study is a contribution to other
studies conducted to examine the impact of corporate governance mechanisms on firm's
performance, understand how to effectively minimize the agency costs and design the
appropriate organizational structure. This research is conducted to check the impact of
corporate governance which is a crucial step in building the market's confidence and
attracting positive investment flows to the institution and the economy. Therefore, the study
extends and contributes to the body of research using selected insurance companies data to
investigate the likely impact of corporate governance on firms' financial performance.
Moreover, the study tries to provide sufficient answers to the following basic research
questions.
1. To what extent does board size affect corporate financial performance?
2. Is there any relationship between board composition and corporate financial
performance?
3. Is there any relationship between leverage and corporate financial performance?
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4. To what extent firm size affect corporate financial performance?
5. Is there any relationship between board gender diversity and corporate financial
performance?
1.3 Objectives of the Study
1.3.1 General Objective
The main objective of the study is to identify the impact of corporate governance such as
board size, board composition, firm size, composition of women in the board of directors
and leverage on firm performance of the selected insurance companies in Ethiopia using five
years data from the year 2008 up to 2012.
1.3.2 Specific Objectives
This study has the following specific objectives:
~ To examine how firm performance IS related to board composition of selected
insurance firms in Ethiopia.
~ To assess the effect of leverage on the performance of selected insurance firms in
Ethiopia.
~ To determine the effect of board size on the financial performance of selected
insurance firms in Ethiopia.
~ To examine how firm performance is related to firm size of selected insurance firms
in Ethiopia.
~ Examine the association between board gender diversity and financial performance of
selected insurance firms in Ethiopia.
1.4 Research Hypotheses
The following hypotheses were formulated to guide the researcher in finding answers to the
research questions:
Board size refers to the number of directors in the board. It is an important factor to
determine the effectiveness of the board. In relation to a relationship between board size and
firm performance, there are two distinct thoughts. The first thought considers that the large
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board size will improve a firm's performance (Adams and Mehran, 2005; Rechner and
Dalton, 1991). However, the second thought considers that a small board size will improve
firms performance (Yokisiwa and Phan, 2004; shakir, 2008)
HI: There is strong negative relationship between board size and corporate financial
performance as measured by ROE.
It is widely debated the impact of board composition in the corporate governance literature in
the form of representation of outside independent directors may add any economic value to
the firm (Kesner et al., 1986; Petra, 2005). Prior research on board composition mainly
focused on firms in advanced economies (Guest, 2008). Studies for example by Kaplan and
Reishus (1990), Byrd and Hickman (1992), Brickley et al. (1994), and Beasley (1996) found a
positive impact from appointing outside independent directors onto the board.
H2: There is strong positive relationship between board composition and corporate
financial performance as measured by ROE.
Firms can really maximize value by using more debt III their operations so as to take
advantage of the tax shield benefits of leverage Modigliani and Miller (1963). According to
Champion (1999), and Leibestein (1966), all contends that companies can use more debt to
enhance their financial performance because of debts' capability to cause managers to
improve productivity to avoid bankruptcy.
H3: There is strong positive relationship between leverage and corporate
performance.
The nature of the relationship between firm size and profitability is an important issue that
may shed some light on the factors that maximize profits. Firms achieve economies of scale
when their operating costs increase at a rate lower than their output. Firms do not achieve
economies of scale simply by increasing their size. Economies of scale are likely to result
only if the firms have sufficient idle capacity and organization systems already in place prior
to expanding (Katrisher & Scordis, 1998).
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H4: There is strong positive relationship between firm size and corporate
performance.
Gender diversity in board composition is seen as a part of good corporate governance, and
research suggests that board diversity is associated with improved financial value (Carter et al.
(2003). Boards are concerned with having right composition to provide diverse perspectives.
Welbourne's (1999) study shows that women on the top management team appear to have a
positive impact on the firm's short-term performance (measured as Tobin's Q) as well as
long-term performance.
H5: There is strong positive relationship between board gender diversity and
corporate performance.
1.5 Significance of the Study
The study has great contribution to policy makers and managers of insurance industry in
Ethiopia to consider the impact of corporate governance on insurance business. This in turn
contributes to the well being of the financial sector of the economy and the society as a whole.
Therefore, the major beneficiaries from this study are regulators, policy makers, managers and
business people in making policies and decisions. It can serve as a stepping stone for future
researchers who want to conduct study on related topic
1.6 Scope of the Study
This project is confined only to the assessment of the impact of corporate governance on firm
performance of selected Ethiopian insurance firms from 2008 to 2012 fiscal periods. It would
have been much better and exhaustive for this study had there been a chance to incorporate
other financial institutions like banks and MFls.
However, to make the study manageable and to investigate the problem thoroughly the study
is limited to incorporate only insurance companies in Ethiopia.
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1. 7 Limitations of the Study
This study tries to investigate the impact of corporate governance on insurance industries of
Ethiopia with a special focus on only selected insurance firms purposively based on age and
availability of data. This may introduce bias inherent with non-probability sampling method.
The other limitation of the study is the data collection method is only secondary data. These
may limit the findings of this study.
1.8 Structure of the Study
This research report is organized into five chapters: Chapter one is the introductory chapter
and presents the back ground of the study, statement of the problem, objectives of the study,
significance of the study, scope of the study, limitations of the study and the organization of
the study. Chapter two contains the review of related theoretical and Empirical literature as
well conceptual frameworks. Chapter three presents the methodology that was used to answer
the research questions and objectives. The fourth chapter presents the results and discussions
of the study, based on data collected from secondary sources. The results of the descriptive
statistics, correlation analysis and regression analysis were also presented in the fourth chapter
of this study. Chapter five contains conclusion and possible recommendations in a manner
that relates to the topic, namely impact of corporate governance mechanisms on firms'
financial performance
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CHAPTER TWO
LITERA TURE REVIEW
2.1 Theoretical Literature
2.1.1 History of Corporate Governance
Corporate governance systems have evolved over centuries, often in response to corporate
failures or systemic crises. The first well-documented failure of governance was the South
Sea Bubble in the 1700s, which revolutionized business laws and practices in England.
Similarly, much of the securities law in the U.S. was put in place following the stock market
crash of 1929 (Hanoi, 2010). As democracy flourished in Europe and USA, it created a
context for the free-market economic system referred to as capitalism. In the early days of
the Industrial Revolution, an unrestrained form of capitalism resulted in a very small number
of people becoming very wealthy while most stayed poor. The political system responded to
the situation with laws and regulations intended to limit the excesses and abuses of the free
and unrestrained markets of the time. In the end, capitalism prevailed under the watchful eye
of the federal and state governments (John, et aI., 2004).
The success of capitalism created opportunities for businesses to grow larger. One driver of
this growth was the opportunity for investors to unite their capital (money) to fund extensive
projects and massive enterprises. These investors became owners of portions or shares of the
businesses in which they invested, and have come to be known as shareholders. The larger
businesses that were created could not be governed effectively by proprietors and
partnerships for many reasons. Consequently, in the twentieth century, the publicly owned
corporation emerged as the dominant legal form for business enterprises.
According to John, et at. (2004), the corporation has three distinctive features that make it an
attractive form for defining the legal entity of a business-its unlimited life, the limited
liability of the owners, and the divisibility of ownership that permits transfer of ownership
interests without disrupting the structure of the organization.
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Today, the public corporation itself operates as a form of representative government. The
owners (shareholders) elect directors as their representatives to manage the affairs of the
business. The directors, who as a group are referred to as the board of directors, then
delegate responsibility for actual operations to the Chief Executive Officer (CEO), whom
they hire. The CEO is accountable to the board of directors, which, collectively and
individually, is accountable to the shareholders. In addition to its role in selecting the CEO,
the board also advises on and consents to the selection of businesses and strategies of the
firm as well as oversees results. In sum, this system of authoritative direction, or
government, is known as corporate governance (John, et al. 2004).
2.1.2 What Is Corporate Governance?
The OECD (2004) defines corporate governance as, "Corporate governance involves a set of
relationships between a company's management, its board, its shareholders and other
stakeholders. Corporate governance also provides the structure through which the objectives
of the company are set, and the means of attaining those objectives and monitoring
performance are determined. Good corporate governance should provide proper incentives
for the board and management to pursue objectives that are in the interests of the company
and its shareholders and should facilitate effective monitoring". "Corporate Governance as a
system by which companies are strategically directed, interactively managed and holistically
controlled in an entrepreneurial and ethical way and in a manner appropriate to each
particular context" (Martin Hilb, 2011). It's a set of relationships between company
directors, shareholders and other stakeholder's as it addresses the powers of directors and of
controlling shareholders over minority interest, the rights of employees, rights of creditors
and other stakeholders (Muriithi, 2009). Corporate governance has also been defined as a
system of law and sound approaches by which corporations are directed and controlled
focusing on the internal and external corporate structures with the intention of monitoring
the actions of management and directors and thereby mitigating agency risks which may
stem from the misdeeds of corporate officers (Sifuna, Anazett 2012).
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2.1.3 Theories of Corporate Governance
2.1.3.1 The Stewardship Theory
The stewardship theory of corporate governance holds that, because people can be trusted to
act in the public good in general and in the interests of their shareholders in particular, it
makes sense to create management and authority structures that, because they provide
unified command and facilitate autonomous decision making, enable companies to act (and
react) quickly and decisively to market opportunities (Alan Calder, 2008). A steward is
defined by Davis, Schoorman & Donaldson (1997) as one who protects and maximizes
shareholders wealth through firm performance, because by so doing, the steward's utility
functions are maximized. This approach leads, for instance, to the combination of the roles
of chair and CEO, and for audit committees to be either non-existent or lightweight. It
stresses on the position of employees or executives to act more autonomously so that the
shareholders' returns are maximized. Indeed, this can minimize the costs aimed at
monitoring and controlling behaviors (Daly et aI., 2003).
Stewardship theory stresses not on the perspective of individualism, but rather on the role of
top management being as stewards, integrating their goals as part of the organization. The
stewardship perspective suggests that stewards are satisfied and motivated when
organizational success is attained. It stresses on the position of employees or executives to
act more autonomously so that the shareholders' returns are maximized. Indeed, this can
minimize the costs aimed at monitoring and controlling behaviors (Daly et aI., 2003). The
theory believes that there is greater utility in cooperative than individualistic behavior and
hence whilst the actions of management would be maximizing shareholder wealth, it would
at the same time be meeting their personal needs. The managers protect and maximize
shareholders wealth through firm performance, because by so doing, their utility functions
are maximized (Davis et aI., 1997). Moreover, stewardship theory suggests unifying the role
of the CEO and the chairman so as to reduce agency costs and to have greater role as
stewards in the organization. It was evident that there would be better safeguarding of the
interest of the shareholders.
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2.1.3.2 The Agency Theory
The agency theory of corporate governance, on the other hand, sees shareholders as the
principals and management as their agents. Agents will, however, act with rational self-
interest: as employee directors of a company, they will tend to maximize their monetary
compensation, job stability and other perks, and do no more than seek to appease
shareholders (Alan Calder, 2008). They cannot, in other words, be expected to act in the
interests of the shareholders. They need, instead, to be monitored and controlled to ensure
that the principals' best interests are served. The agency theory shareholders expect the
agents to act and make decisions in the principal's interest. On the contrary, the agent may
not necessarily make decisions in the best interests of the principals (Padilla, 2000). Agency
theory is concerned with resolving two problems that can occur in agency relation-ships. The
first is the agency problem that arises when (a) the desires or goals of the principal and agent
conflict and (b) it is difficult or expensive for the principal to verify what the agent is
actually doing. The problem here is that the principal cannot verify that the agent has
behaved appropriately. The second is the problem of risk sharing that arises when the
principal and agent have different attitudes toward risk. The problem here is that the
principal and the agent may prefer different actions because of the different risk preferences
(Kathleen, 2014).
Agency theory can be employed to explore the relationship between the ownership and
management structure. However, where there is a separation, the agency model can be
applied to align the goals of the management with that of the owners. The model of an
employee portrayed in the agency theory is more of a self interested, individualistic and are
bounded rationality where rewards and punishments seem to take priority (Jensen &
Meckling, 1976). The agency relationship is the principal engaged another person under
contract or the agent to perform some services on the behalf of which delegating some
decision making authority to agent Jensen and meckling (1976).
Agency theory suggests that the management of an organization is undertaken on behalf of
the owners of that organization, in other words the shareholders. Consequently the
management of value created by the organization is only pertinent insofar as that value
accrues to the shareholders of the firm. The clear implication for corporate governance is
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that adequate monitoring mechanisms need to be established to protect shareholders from
management's conflict of interest - the so-called "agency costs" of modern capitalism
(Fama and Jensen, 1983). The agency model is widely accepted in the business community,
as can be seen by the widespread adoption of normative guidelines emphasizing the need for
independent directors to monitor the activities of the board (Bosch, 1995). If agency theory
holds, therefore, we would expect to find the following patterns:
Pattern (a): High levels of outsiders on the board are associated with high monitoring of
management, which is associated with low agency costs and consequently high corporate
performance.
Alternatively, agency theory suggests that if management interests dominate the board, there
will be little opportunity for monitoring of their activities. As a result, we would expect
there to be a link between the reduced monitoring and a rise in agency costs. Hence, we
would also anticipate finding that:
Pattern (b): Low levels of outsiders on the board are associated with low monitoring of
management, which is associated with high agency costs and low corporate performance.
Thus Agency Theory argues that managers merely act as custodians of the organization and
its operational activities and places upon them the burden of managing in the best interest of
the owners of that business. According to agency theory all other stakeholders of the
business are largely irrelevant and if they benefit from the business then this is coincidental
to the activities of management in running the business to serve shareholders.
2.1.3.3 Resource Dependency Theory
Resource dependence theory is the study of how the external resources of organizations
affect the behavior of the organization. Resource dependence theory has implications
regarding the optimal divisional structure of organizations, recruitment of board members
and employees, production strategies, contract structure, external organizational links, and
many other aspects of organizational strategy Pfeffer and Salancik (1978). Resource
dependence concerns more than the external organizations that provide, distribute, finance,
and compete with a firm. Although executive decisions have more individual weight than
non-executive decisions, in aggregate the latter have greater organizational impact.
Managers throughout the organization understand their success is tied to customer demand.
13
Johnson et ai, (1996) concurs that resource dependency theorists provide focus on the
appointment of representatives of independent organizations as a means for gaining access in
resources critical to firm success. For example, outside directors who are partners to a law
firm provide legal advice, either in board meetings or in private communication with the firm
executives that may otherwise be more costly for the firm to secure. It has been argued that
the provision of resources enhances organizational functioning, firm's performance and its
survival (Daily et ai, 2003). The stakeholder theory focuses on relationships with many
groups for individual benefits; resource dependency theory concentrates on the role of board
directors in providing access to resources needed by the firm. Hillman, Canella and Paetzold
(2000) contend that resource dependency theory focuses on the role that directors play in
providing or securing essential resources to an organization through their linkages to the
external environment. It has been argued that the provision of resources enhances
organizational functioning, firm's performance and its survival (Daily et ai, 2003). According
to Hillman, Canella and Paetzold (2000) that directors bring resources to the firm, such as
information, skills, access to key constituents such as suppliers, buyers, public policy makers,
social groups as well as legitimacy.
A Resource Dependence Theory Perspective" by Pfeffer and Salancik (1978) marks the
starting point of Resource Dependence Theory. The theory's fundamental assumption is that
organizations are not self-sufficient, but depend on resources provided by their environments
to achieve organizational goals (Hillman, Withers, and Collins (2009); Pfeffer and Salancik
(1978)). Because of the division of labor management also depends on the resources such as
work effort, expertise, and organizational connections provided by individual employees,
work groups, or departments (Bartol and Martin (1988)). The degree to which management
depends on any employee is defined as the inverse of the power that same employee has over
his or her manager. The more critical and the less substitutable the resources subordinates use
to derive their contributions are to management's ability to achieve defined goals, the higher
the employee power, and with it the degree of managerial dependence, will be. As a
response, managerial dependence will trigger actions such as management control to ensure
that goals are achieved (Bartol and Martin (1988); Green and Welsh (1988)).
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2.1.3.4 The Stakeholder's Theory
According to David & Shahla, (2011) the arguments for stakeholders theory is based upon
the assertion that maximizing wealth for shareholders fails to maximize wealth for society
and all its members and that only a concern with managing all stakeholders' interests
achieves this. It states that all stakeholders must be considered in the decision making
process of the organization. Wheeler, et aI., (2002) argued that stakeholder theory was
derived from a combination of the sociological and organizational disciplines. Stakeholder
theory can be defined as any group or individual who can affect or is affected by the
achievement of the organization's objectives. Stakeholder theorists suggest that managers in
organizations have a network of relationships to serve - this include the suppliers,
employees and business partners.
Stakeholder theory was derived from a combination of the sociological and organizational
disciplines. Stakeholder theory can be defined as any group or individual who can affect or
is affected by the achievement of the organization's objectives. Stakeholder theorists
suggest that managers in organizations have a network of relationships to serve - this
include the suppliers, employees and business partners Wheeler et ai, (2002). On the other
hand, Sundaram & Inkpen (2004) contend that stakeholder theory attempts to address the
group of stakeholders deserving and requiring management's attention.
Stakeholder theory is managerial, it reflects and directs how managers operate rather than
primarily addressing management theorists and economists. The focus of stakeholder theory
is articulated in two core questions (Freeman 1994). First, it asks, what is the purpose of the
firm? This encourages managers to articulate the shared sense of the value they create, and
what brings its core stakeholders together. This propels the firm forward and allows it to
generate outstanding performance, determined both in terms of its purpose and marketplace
financial metrics. Second, stakeholder theory asks, what responsibility does management
have to stakeholders? This pushes managers to articulate how they want to do business.
Specifically, what kinds of relationships they want and need to create with their stakeholders
to deliver on their purpose.
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Finally, from the theories discussed from the above the agency theory explains more the
corporate governance mechanisms and firms financial performance.
2.1.4 The International Scope of Good Corporate Governance
Numerous codes of best practices and corporate governance principles have been developed
over the last 10 years. Worldwide, more than 200 codes have been written in some 72
countries and regions.19 Most of these codes focus on the role of the Supervisory Board or
Board of Directors in a company (OEeD 2004). Handfuls are international in scope.
Among these, only the OEeD Principles address both policymakers and businesses, and
focus on the entire governance framework (shareholder rights, stakeholders, and disclosure
and board practices). The OEeD Principles have gained worldwide acceptance as a
framework and reference point for corporate governance. Published in 1999 and revised in
2004, they were developed to provide principle-based guidance on good governance. The
OEeD corporate governance framework is built on four core values:
• Fairness: The corporate governance framework should protect shareholder rights and
ensure the equitable treatment of all shareholders, including minority and foreign
shareholders. All shareholders should have the opportunity to obtain effective redress for
violations of their rights.
• Responsibility: The corporate governance framework should recognize the rights of
stakeholders as established by law, and encourage active co-operation between corporations
and stakeholders in creating wealth, jobs, and the sustainability of financially sound
enterprises.
• Transparency: The corporate governance framework should ensure that timely and
accurate disclosure is made on all material matters regarding the company, including its
financial situation, governance structure, performance and ownership.
• Accountability: The corporate governance framework should ensure the strategic
guidance of the company, the effective monitoring of management by the Board, and the
Board's accountability to the company and shareholders.
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Corporate governance has been shown to be documented In an effective manner in the
literature. For instance, most studies have examined the impact of the board characteristics
(CEO duality, CEO tenure, audit committee, leverage, board size and composition of the
Board) on firm performance. Hence this study will investigate the relationship between
corporate governance mechanisms namely, board size, leverage and board composition with
the firm's performance (OECD 2004).
2.1.5 Corporate Governance in Ethiopia
Good corporate governance enhances the confidence of investors in the cornparues and
positively contributes towards the overall business environment. Well-governed companies
often draw huge investment premiums, get access to cheaper debt, and outperform their
objectives. The issue of corporate governance in Ethiopia is new. The financial sector is still
underdeveloped and largely owned and controlled by the government (Asnakech 2012).
The Commercial Code of Ethiopia (hereinafter the Commercial Code) incorporates
provisions pertinent to the governance of share companies. However, such provisions are
inadequate to address specific issues in corporate governance related to board of directors
such as separation of roles of nonexecutive directors and CEOs, composition and
independence of the board as well as director's remuneration. Moreover, proclamations and
directives governing financial share companies in Ethiopia do not sufficiently address the
aforementioned issues (Hussien, 2012)
Minga Negash (2008) observes that the status of corporate governance in Ethiopia is
disappointing and notes that the Commercial Code of 1960 does not provide adequate
legislative response to complex governance issues of the day, and the new draft corporate
law has not yet been finalized; and he further states that key international conventions, codes
and standards are not ratified or adequately incorporated in the Proclamations and that the
Decrees and Directives lack coherence and foresights, and at times suffer from poor drafting.
Fekadu (2010) underlines the growing separation between ownership and control in
Ethiopia, and he submits some empirical evidence in this regard. Relying on the data and
literature on corporate governance, he shows the deficiency of the Commercial Code 111
protecting the rights of minority shareholders in the context of publicly held companies.
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The study conducted by Ethiopian Chambers of Commerce and Sectoral Associations on
corporate governance in Ethiopia by Gabo & Zekrie (2009), suggests the introduction of a
voluntary code of corporate governance in the country. It recommends that corporate
governance law reform should consider key development policy aspects which match with
the country's plans for poverty reduction and wealth creation.
This article takes the themes discussed in the aforementioned works further and makes a
distinction between corporate governance and corporate management, and examines whether
the same should be stipulated in the relevant laws with a clear articulation of the powers of
non-executive board members. The article also argues that there is inadequacy in the law on
the composition and independence of directors and forwards recommendations.
2.1.6 Insurance Companies in Ethiopia
The history of insurance service is as far back as modern form of banking service in Eth iopia
which was introduced in 1905. At the time, an agreement was reached between Emperor
Menelik II and a representative of the British owned National Bank of Egypt to open a new
bank in Ethiopia. Similarly, modern insurance service, which were introduced in Ethiopia by
foreigners, mark out their origin as far back as 1905 when the bank of Abyssinia began to
transact fire and marine insurance as an agent of a foreign insurance company. According to
a survey made in 1954, there were nine insurance companies that were providing insurance
service in the country. With the exception of Imperial Insurance Company that was
established in 1951, all the remaining of the insurance companies were either branches or
agents of foreign companies. In 1960, the number of insurance companies increased
considerably and reached 33. At that time insurance business like any business undertaking
was classified as trade and was administered by the provisions of the commercial code.
According to Hailu Zeleke (2007), the first significant event that the Ethiopian insurance
market observation was the issuance of proclamation No. 28111970 and this proclamation
was issued to provide for the control & regulation of insurance business in Ethiopia.
Consequently, it created an insurance council and an insurance controller's office, its strange
impact in the sector. The controller of insurance licensed 15 domestic insurance companies,
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36 agents, 7 brokers, 3 actuaries & 11 assessors in accordance with the provisions of the
proclamation immediately in the year after the issuance of the law.
Accordingly, as stated by the office mentioned above, the law required an insurer to be a
domestic company whose share capital (fully subscribed) not to be less than Ethiopian Birr
400,000 for a general insurance business, Birr 600,000 in the case of long-term insurance
business and Birr 1,000,000 to do both long-term & general insurance business. The
proclamation defined 'domestic company' as a share company having its head office in
Ethiopia and in the case of a company transacting a general insurance business at least 51%
and in the case of a company transacting life insurance business, at least 30% of the paid-up
capital must be held by Ethiopian nationals or national companies.
After four years that is after the enactment of the proclamation, the military government that
came to power in 1974 put an end to all private enterprises. Then all insurance companies
operating were nationalized and from January 1, 1975 onwards the government took over the
ownership and control of these companies & merged them into a single unit called Ethiopian
Insurance Corporation. In the years following nationalization, Ethiopian Insurance
Corporation became the sole operator. After the change in the political environment in 1991,
the proclamation for the licensing and supervision of insurance business heralded the
beginning of a new era. Immediately after the enactment of the proclamation in the 1994,
private insurance companies began to increase.
Before October, 2003 in Ethiopia the corporate governance of banks and insurance firms is
directed and supervised by the central bank. The National Bank of Ethiopia monitors and
controls the insurance business and functions as regulators of the country's money supply.
Accordingly, national bank of Ethiopia issued directives on the size, composition and
competence of board of directors. According to banking business Proclamation (No.
592/2008) the national bank is responsible to issue directives on the qualification and
competency to be fulfilled by directors; the minimum number of directors in the membership
of the board of a bank; the duties, responsibilities and good corporate governance of the
boards of directors of bank; the maximum number of years a director may serve in any bank.
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In October 2013 Addis Ababa Chamber of Commerce and Sectoral Associations (AACCSA)
is actively pursuing the establishment of a non-government, private and voluntary
membership based organizations and finally they established Institute of Corporate
Governance (ElCG).
2.1.7 Corporate Governance Mechanisms and Firms Financial
Performance
Empirical researches on corporate governance use either market-based measures or
accounting-based measures to assess firm performance. Klein (1998) uses return on assets
(ROA) and Lo (2003) uses return on equity (ROE) as an operating performance indicator.
Brown and Caylor (2005) use ROE and ROA as their two operating performance measures.
We can measure the operating performance of a firm through the ROA ratio which shows
the amount of earnings have generated from an invested capital assets (Epps & Cereola
2008). Matolcsy & Wright (2011) measured firm performance measured by ROA (Return on
Assets= EBlT / Average total Assets - in book value -), ROE (Return on Equity=net profit /
equity - in book value -), ~MVE (Change in market value of equity), ~MVE risk (Change in
market value of equity, adjusted for dividends and risk). Yasser et al. (2011) used return on
equity (ROE) and profit margin (PM) for the measurement of firm performance.
Market based measures of companies' performance were done by Shah et al. (2011) by
Marris ratio (Market value of equity/ book value of equity) and Tobin's Q (market value of
equity + book value of debt/total of assets - in book value -), whereas financial reporting
perspective was measured by ROE and Return on investment (net result + interest) / (equity
+ total debt). Bhagat & Black (1999) measured dependent variable firm performance by
Tobin's Q, Return on assets (Operating income/Assets), Turnover ratio (Sales/Assets),
Operating margin (Operating income/Sales), Sales per employee and also by Growth of
Assets, Sales, Operating income, Employees and Cash flows.
Several studies have been done in developed and developing countries (Baysinger & Butler,
1985; Rechner & Dalton, 1991; Coles & Jarrell, 2001; Rhoades et aI, 2001; Khatri et aI.,
2002; Judge et aI., 2003) which examined the relationship between corporate governance
and firm performance. A thorough review of the relevant literature revealed that there is a
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paucity of studies examining the performance implications of corporate governance in the
developing countries, in general, and in the Gulf region, in particular. This calls for further
research work to be put forth to examine this relationship and that is the direction this study
is trying to contribute to through examining the between corporate governance and firm
performance of Ethiopian selected insurance companies.
Corporate governance has been shown to be documented 111 an effective manner in the
literature. For instance, most studies have examined the impact of the board characteristics
(firm size, leverage, CEO duality, audit committee size, board gender diversity, board size
and composition of the board) on firm performance. Hence, this study will investigate the
relationship between corporate governance mechanisms namely, firm size, leverage, board
gender diversity, board size and composition of the board with the firm's performance.
2.1.7.1 Board Composition and Firm Performance
Board composition has been highly debated in the realms of economics, organizational
science literatures, and finance on the empirical and the theoretical levels. It has also been
debated that effective ways of monitoring can assist the boards in making executives
effectively take care of the shareholder's interests rather than their own (Ramdani & Van,
2009). According to agency theory, a larger proportion of independent directors generally
provide better firm performance. In general, it has been concluded by Ramdani and Van
(2009) that the proportion of independent directors has an effect on firm performance.
Boards mostly compose of executive and non-executive directors. Executive directors refer
to dependent directors and non-Executive directors to independent directors (Shah et aI.,
2011). At least one third of independent directors are preferred in board, for effective
working of board and for unbiased monitoring. Dependent directors are also important
because they have insider knowledge of the organization which is not available to outside
directors, but they can misuse this knowledge by transferring wealth of other stockholders to
themselves (Beasly, 1996). Previous studies examining the relationship between board
composition and firm performance have been inconsistent. For example, some researchers
(such as Forsberg, 1989; Hermalin & Weisbach, 1991; Zahra & Pearce, 1989) found that
there is no significant relationship. On the other hand, other studies found that firms with
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board of directors dominated by outsiders are able to perform better (Adams & Mehran,
1995; John & Senbet, 1998).
2.1.7.2 Board Size and Firm Performance
Board size refers to the number of directors In the board. It is an important factor to
determine the effectiveness of the board. Jensen and Meckling (1976) argued that a bigger
size board of directors may improve the companies' board effectiveness and support the
management in reducing agency cost that resulted from poor management and consequently
leads to better financial results. The Chairman should be allowed to provide commands to all
the executive and non-executive directors. Hermalin and Weisbach (2003) argued the
possibility that larger boards can be less effective than small boards. When boards consist of
too many members agency problems may increase, as some directors may tag along as free-
riders. They argued that when a board becomes too big, it often moves into a more symbolic
role, rather than fulfilling its intended function as part of the management. On the other
hand, very small boards lack the advantage of having the spread of expert advice and
opinion around the table that is found in larger boards.
In the relevant literature, even though there have been many studies that examined the
relationship between board size and firm performance, the findings turned up to be
inconclusive. In examining this relationship in the Japanese listed companies, Yokishawa
and Phan (2004) found that there is a negative association between board size and firm
performance. Similarly, Shakir (2008) found a negative relationship between board size and
firm performance which supported the conclusion of Jensen (1993) that for a firm to be
effective in its monitoring, it should have a relatively small board of directors. In relation to
that, Haniffa and Hudaib (2006) argued that a large board is seen as less effective in
monitoring performance and could also be costly for companies in terms of compensation
and increased incentives to shirk.
Vafeas (2000) reported that firms with the smallest boards (minimum of five board
members) are better informed about the earnings of the firm and thus can be regarded as
having better monitoring abilities. Echoing the above findings, Mak and Yuanto (2003)
reported that listed firm valuations of Singaporean and Malaysian firms are highest when the
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board consists of five members. Bennedsen, Kongsted and Nielsen (2004), in their analysis
of small and medium-sized closely held Danish corporations reported that board size has no
effect on performance for a board size of below six members but found a significant
negative relation between the two when the board size increases to seven members or more.
Bhagat and Black (2002), found no solid evidence on the relationship between board size
and performance. In an attempt to compare the effects of board structure on firm
performance between Japanese and Australian firms, Bonn, Yokishawa and Phan (2004)
found that board size and performance (measured by market-to-book ratio and return on
assets) was negatively correlated for Japanese firms but found no relationship between the
two variables for its Australian counterpart. However, contrary to the Japanese firms the
ratios of outside directors and female directors to total board numbers have a positive impact
in the Australian sample (Bonn, 2004).
On the contrary, prior studies regarding the size of the board supported the positive
relationship between the size of the board of directors and corporate performance. Large
boards are viewed to lead to a better business performance owing to the wide variety of
skills present for better decision making and monitor the performance of the CEO. For
example, Adams and Mehran (2005) found a positive relationship between board size and
performance in the U.S. banking industry. Moreover, Rechner and Dalton (1991) have also
reported that large boards are associated with stronger performance. These results supported
the conclusion made by Pfeffer (1972) and Zahra and Pearce (1989) regarding the
relationship between the board size and firm performance.
2.1.7.3 Leverage and Firm Performance
Leverage has been used in a number of empirical studies (such as Kyereboah-Colernan,
Biekpe, 2006; Alsaeed; 2006) that have examined the relationship between corporate
governance and financial performance of the company. In their attempt to justify taking the
leverage as a control variable, these studies have revealed that the debt has an effect on the
financial performance of the company. As suggested by Alsaeed (2006), the firm leverage
was measured by dividing total of liabilities by the total of assets.
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Significant creditors, such as banks, have large investments in the firm, and want to see the
returns on their investments materialize. Their power comes in part because of a variety of
control rights they receive when firms default or violate debt covenants (Smith and Warner,
1979) and in part because they typically lend short term, so borrowers have to come back at
regular short intervals for more funds. As a result, banks and other large creditors are in
many ways similar to the large shareholders. Diamond (1984) presents one of the first
models of monitoring by the large creditors. Debt owed to large creditors such as banks is
believed to be a useful tool for reducing the agency problem. Large creditors, like large
stakeholders, also have interest in seeing that managers take performance-improving
measures.
2.1.7.4 Firm Size and Firm Performance
Generally, the firm size of financial institutions has been measured using a combination of
financial ratio analysis, benchmarking, measuring performance against budget or a mix of
these methodologies (Avkiran, 1995). Dhawan (2001), who examined the relation between
firm size and productivity for U.S. firms between 1970 and 1989, actually finds the
opposition relationship between firm size and profitability. Nagarajan & Burthwal (1990)
revealed the Co-efficient of growth rate of sales was positive and significant, suggesting that
factors on the demand side of a firm had a greater impact on profitability than on the supply
side. There are predefined methods for measuring the performance of a firm. The difficulty
in relying on these measures is that different performance measures can conflict (Lumpkin &
Dess, 1996). Dess & Robinson (1984) reported strong and statistically significant
relationships between the subjective comparative assessments of the 5-year performance of
18 businesses by their top management against other similar businesses in their industries,
and the objective measures of return on assets and sales growth. In a common sense, it is
considered that the profitability of a firm depends upon organizational growth. While growth
has been considered the most important measure in small firms, it has also been argued that
financial performance is multidimensional in nature and that measures such as financial
performance and growth are different aspects of performance that need to be considered
(Wiklund, 1999). It has also been argued that firms grow in many ways and that a firm's
growth pattern is related to age, size and industry (Delmar, Davidsson, & Gartner, 2003).
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Hardwick (1997) argues that there is a positive relationship between performance and size
due to operating cost efficiencies through increasing output and economizing on unit of cost.
Large corporate size also enables insurers to effectively diversify their assumed risks and
respond more quickly to changes in market conditions. Industrial organization economists
such as Bain (1968) and Scherer (1980) have argued that large firms possess monopoly
power which allows them to set prices above the economic costs involved in the production
of the products resulting in additional profit for the larger firms. In terms of investment
performance, Adams (1996) believes that large companies are able to diversify their
investment portfolios and this could reduce their business risks. Grace and Timme (1992)
suggest that large companies generally outperform smaller ones because they manage to
utilize economies of scale and have the resources to attract and retain managerial talent.
Therefore, it is expected that performance is positively related with size of company.
2.1.7.5 Board Gender Diversity and Firm Performance
Gender diversity in the boardroom and in top executive positions has been the focus of
public debate, academic research, government considerations and corporate strategy for
more than a decade now. Previously considered a social issue and an issue of image, gender
diversity is increasingly approached as a value-driver in organizational strategy and
corporate governance, and as such has become a challenging issue in recent academic
research. Positive performance effects of board gender diversity imply that a higher number
of women in corporate top positions or on board of directors will relate to increased firm
productivity and profitability.
In order to increase the number of women in top positions, affirmative actions are under
discussion or already operational in several countries. In Norway, for example, from 2006
onwards large firms must have at least 40% female representation among the members of the
board of directors, as a result of which Norway currently scores 44.2% female board
representation (European PWN 2008). In Finland, the new Corporate Governance Code of
2008 requires that from January 1, 2010 Finish listed companies have at least one female
board director, or if not, explain the reasons why (www.europeanpwn.net).
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A priori, there are several reasons why gender diversity could lead to superior firm
performance and improved shareholders' wealth. First, studies of the structure and function
of boards of directors provide some insight and perspective on the gender issue. Gender
diversity in board composition is seen as a part of good corporate governance, and research
suggests that board diversity is associated with improved financial value (Carter et al.
(2003)). Board independence can be a necessary condition for a well-functioning board, thus
leading to better shareholders' wealth.l Carter et al. (2003) argue that diversity can increase
board independence because directors with a different gender, ethnicity, or cultural
background might ask questions that would not come from directors with more traditional
backgrounds. In a recent paper, Adams and Ferreira (2007) provide evidence that gender
diversity on boards is related to firm performance that is measured as Tobin's Q and ROA,
and that the relation depends on the governance structure. In their findings, gender diversity
on the board of directors enhances firm performance when firms have a weak governance
structure. Consequently, their results indicate that gender diversity may function as a tough
monitor (i.e., a good governance mechanism) upon the strong demand for it.
Second, the studies of the effectiveness of organizational culture suggest that open and
flexible organizational environments may contribute to superior firm performance (Rose and
Kumar (2006), Samson and Terziovski, and Powell (1995)). The culture of the firm
determines the organization's ability to deal with change in the business environment. The
"right" culture is critical to improving the effectiveness of management performance. This
could be because more open and flexible cultures provide employees with workplaces where
they are likely to be self-motivating without the need for controls.
Analyzing U.S. firms where inclusion of women directors is voluntary, Adams and Ferreira
(2009) document that boards with women directors have lower director attendance problems
and that CEO turnover in such firms is more sensitive to firm performance, consistent with
more effective monitoring. They however find that female directors have a negative impact
on firm performance, especially for well governed firms. Farrell and Hersch (2005) find that
director gender has no impact on firm performance and conclude that the addition of women
to the board of directors appears to be driven by tokenism. While Carter, Simkins and
Simpson (2003) find a positive relation between gender diversity of the board and firm
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performance, Adams and Ferreira (2009) show that this relationship disappears once
endogeneity issues are fully addressed.
2.2 Review of Related Empirical Studies
Yenesew (2012) examined the relationship between corporate governance mechanisms and
firm financial performance using eight Ethiopian commercial banks with a data set covering
five years period from the year 2007 to 2011. The researcher used return on asset, return on
equity, net interest margin measure and board size, board gender diversity, board member
educational qualification, business management experience of directors, industry specific
experience of directors, audit committee size, as explanatory variables and bank size, bank
leverage and bank growth as control variables of the study. The study points out that board
size has a significant negative effect on return on equity but its negative effect on return on
asset and net interest margin was insignificant. No statistically significant relation was
found between percentage of female directors and financial performance. However, this is
due to very small numbers of female directors as observed in the descriptive statistics which
does not permit them to be powerful enough to make a difference to monitoring. Board
members educational qualification significantly and positively influences the financial
performance of sample commercial banks and industry specific experience of director
positively and significantly influence return on asset. Contrary to this negatively and
significantly related with net interest margin. But it has not significant relation with return
on equity. Audit committee size has a negative relation with all the three financial
performance of commercial banks but not statistically significant with return on equity. It
implied that audit committee size negatively and significantly influence commercial banks
performance as measured by return on asset and net interest margin.
Rashid et al. (2010) examines the influence of corporate board composition in the form of
representation of outside independent directors on firm economic performance in
Bangladesh. Two hypotheses are developed to examine the relationship among composition
of board memberships including independent directors and firm performance. An
observation of 274 Bangladeshi firms is used in the study. A linear regression analysis is
used to test the hypotheses. Results reveal that the outside (independent) directors cannot
add potential value to the firm's economic performance in Bangladesh. The idea of the
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introduction of independent directors may have benefits for greater transparency, but the
non-consideration of the underlying institutional and cultural differences in an emerging
economy such as Bangladesh may not result in economic value addition to the firm.
Abdullah Kaid et al., (2012) examined the relationship between board characteristics and the
firm performance of non-financial listed Kuwaiti firms. To achieve the objectives of the
study, the data were collected from a sample of 136 companies for the financial year 2009.
Variables such as CEO duality, COE tenure, audit committee size, board size and board
composition were considered as predictors of the firm performance that was measured
employing the return on assets (ROA). By contrast, the effects of CEO tenure and leverage
on firm performance were found to be negative and significant at the chosen level of
significance. To test the hypotheses of the study, multiple linear regression analysis using
SPSS 18.0 was utilized. Using the firm size and leverage as a control variable, the findings
of the study support the positive effects of CEO duality and audit committee size on ROA.
Demis (2013) has undertaken a study to evaluate the financial performance of non-life
insurance industry in Ethiopia by using CARAMEL frame work. The researcher selected 10
insurance companies from the total of 15 based on their year of establishment. Secondary
data collected from the individual insurance companies and from the National Bank of
Ethiopia from the fiscal year of 2008 to 2012 was used for the completion of the study.
ROA has been used as the dependent variable explained by capital adequacy, assets quality,
re-insurance, actuarial issues, management efficiency, earning and profitability and
liquidity. Multiple linear regressions were applied. From the multiple linear regressions, it
was found that assets quality and combined ratio have negative relationship whereas capital
adequacy and retention ratio have positive relationship with performance (ROA) of
insurance industry in Ethiopia.
Tanna, s. et al., (2013) exam ine the effect of board size and composition on the efficiency of
United Kingdom banks a sample of 17 banking institutions operating in the UK between
2001 and 2006 to provide empirical evidence on the association between the efficiency of
UK banks and board structure, namely board size and composition. Their approach is to first
use data envelopment analysis to estimate several measures of the efficiency of banks, and
then panel data regressions for investigating the impact of board structure on efficiency.
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After controlling for bank size and capital strength, they found some evidence of a positive
association between board size and efficiency, although this is not robust across all our
specifications. Board composition, by contrast, has a robustly significant and positive
impact on all measures of efficiency.
Finally, as far as the researcher's knowledge is concerned so far no study appears to have
been conducted that provide empirical evidence particularly on the impact of corporate
governance mechanisms on financial performance of insurance firms in Ethiopia. Given this
lack of empirical evidences, this study fills the gap and provides empirical evidence on the
impact of corporate governance mechanisms on financial performance of selected insurance
firms in Ethiopia by taking in to consideration the variables related to the realities of the
insurance governance mechanism in Ethiopia.
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2.3 Conceptual framework of the study
Based on the agency theory the following diagrammatic framework is developed.
Figure 2.1 Conceptual framework of the study
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CHAPTER THREE
RESEARCH DESIGN AND METHODOLOGY
3.1 Introduction
This section provides information on the type of research design that was adopted in the
study and gives the population and sample selected for the study. It also shows which
sampling techniques were used in the current research. Furthermore, it discusses the data
collection, analysis and presentation techniques that were used in the study.
3.2 Research Design
The primary aim of this study is to examine the impact of corporate governance mechanisms
on firm's financial performance. To achieve the objectives of this study, the explanatory
research design was used to investigate the relationships between board size, board
composition, firm size, board gender diversity and leverage as independent variables and
firm performance (ROE) as the dependent variable.
3.3 Population and Sample Selection
The sample selected for this research was selected companies listed by National Bank of
Ethiopia (NBE). In Ethiopia there are 16 private and one government insurance companies
registered. This study sought to investigate the effects of Corporate Governance on the
financial performance of selected insurance firms in Ethiopia. In this research Data
availability is important, because of this the researcher obliged to apply a purposive sampling
technique out of the non probability sample selection techniques. So, insurance companies
with financial report from 2008 - 2012 are considered as a representative sample of the
study. Thus, ten firms were potentially selected. The data collection technique is mainly
document analysis on the annual reports of the companies.
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3.4 Data Gathering Techniques
The study has employed secondary data by reviewing of annual reports, financial statements,
and other relevant documents of the selected insurance firms, documents of the regulatory
bodies and other pertinent offices have been used as the sources of secondary data
collection. The secondary data provides a reliable source of the information needed by
researchers to investigate the phenomenon and seek efficient ways for problem solving
situations (Sekaran, 2003). The data required for this study was collected from the annual
reports of the companies as in the end of 2012. Specifically, they were collected from the
annual reports particularly from the portion expounding on corporate information and
statement of corporate governance as well as from the director's profile. Regarding the data
related to the firm performance, they were collected from financial statements like balance
sheet, income statement, and cash flow statement provided in the annual reports.
3.5 Data Analysis Techniques
The objective of the analysis is for drawing important conclusions about the impacts of
corporate governance on firm performance. Based on the general concepts, the statement of
the purpose of the institutions' existence, and their real practices; strengths and gaps can be
identified and analyzed using quantitative analysis. This study uses Correlation analysis,
which is a statistical tool that can be used to determine the level of association of two
variables (Levin & Rubin, 1998). This analysis can be seen as the initial step in statistical
modeling to determine the relationship between the dependent and independent variables.
This study also used a multiple linear regression analysis using Return on Equity (ROE) as
proxy for the firms' financial performance and independent variables comprising of Board
Size, Board Composition, firm size, composition of women's in the board of directors and
Leverage. The study makes data's statistical description and regression by using STATA 11,
which is a common method adopted frequently in descriptive studies.
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3.6 Description of Variables and Measurements
This study select the dependent and independent variables based on alternative theories and
previous empirical studies related to corporate governance and firm performance to
investigate their relation (corporate governance and firm performance) measured by return
on equity (ROE).
3.6.1 Dependent Variable
Return on Equity (ROE)
ROE refers to the amount of net income returned as a percentage of shareholders equity.
Return on equity measures a corporation's profitability by revealing how much profit a
company generates with the money shareholders have invested. Each insurance firm's ROE
has been obtained from its annual reports. ROE is expressed as a percentage and calculated
as: Net Income/Shareholder's Equity * 100.
Profit After Tax
ROE =
Total Shareholders' Equity
3.6.2 Independent Variables
In this study, the independent variables are variables that are used as a determinant of
corporate governance of the sample Ethiopian insurance firms. The independent variables of
the study are board size, board composition, board gender diversity, leverage and firm size.
The definition and measurements of the variables are as follows:-
Board Gender Diversity
The ratio of females setting in the board of directors is measured as the percentage of
number of female directors divided by the total number of board members. According to
Yenesew (2012) in his qualitative analysis revealed that qualified and competent female
director's help improve banks operation and monitoring performance.
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Board Size
It can be defined as the number of directors sitting on the board. Large board size the greater
collective information that the board subsequently possess but in other hand, when the board
size is large there is a problem of communication and decision making. Previous studies
found negative effect of board size on performance (Jensen, 2003; Sanda et al., 2005;
Aduesi, 2011; AI-Manaseer et al., 2012). In this study board size is expected to negatively
influence performance.
Board Composition
Board composition is the proportion of independent directors to the total number of
directors. Boards mostly compose of executive and non-executive directors. Executive
directors refer to dependent directors and non-Executive directors to independent directors
(Shah et al., 2011). Independent directors are directors who have no personal affiliations or
business dealings with the firm but in Ethiopian context independent directors are directors
those have owns the share of the particular company and not the member of the management
team.
Firm size:- The natural logarithm of total assets at year-end.
Leverage: - The ratio of total liabilities to total assets.
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Table 3.1 Summary for terms of measurement
variables Acronym Terms of measurement
Board Size (number) BORDSIZ Total number of directors serving on the board
of directors
Board Composition BORDCOM The ratio of independence directors to the total
number of directors
Leverage (%) LEVERAGE The ratio of total liabilities to total assets
Firm Size (number) FIRMSIZ The natural logarithm of total assets at year-
end.
Board gender diversity WOMDIR The percentage of number of female directors
divided by the total number of board members
Return on Equity ROE Amount of net income returned as a percentage
of shareholders equity
Source: financial statements of the Insurance firms
3.7 Model Specification and Multiple Regressions
The econometrics model from the previous studies undertaken:
Yit = Po+PIXlit+P2X2it+ +nkit+ £ adopted from Mamadou (2012)
Based on the hypothesis development procedures, the following regression equation was meant
to be estimated:
ROE = Po + PI BOADSIZE + P2*BOADCOM + P3*LEVERAGE + P4*FIRMSIZ
Ps*COMWOM + e
+
Where, ROE - return on equity
Po - Constant
BOADSIZE -board size
BOADCOM - board composition
LEVERAGE - Leverage
FIRMSIZ - firm size
COMWOM - composition of women's on the board of directors
£ - Error term
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CHAPTER FOUR
RESUL TS AND DISCUSSION
This chapter presents two important parts of the paper namely, the descriptive and regression
analysis. The descriptive statistics which summarizes the main features of the study variable such
as mean, maximum, minimum and standard deviation. The second part is the multiple regression
analysis with the help of stata 11.0 that shows the relationship of ROE with the explanatory
variables.
4.1 Descriptive Statistics of the Study Variables
In this section a description of the key characteristics and terms of measurement for each
variables are discussed. This study focused on Corporate Governance characteristics namely
board size, board composition, board gender diversity, firm size and Leverage and how they
affect performance. Dependent and independent variables were grouped into components;
namely, independent variables which consist of board size, board composition, board gender
diversity, firm size and Leverage and dependent variables which indicates performance
namely, return on Equity (ROE). Accordingly, the descriptive statistics for all variables are
presented below in table 4.1.
Table 4.1: Descriptive Statistics of the study variables
Variables Mean Std.div mm 1 max Observation
s
Roe .1901528 .1183158 -.15 .4997455 50
bordsiz 6.56 1.145711 5 9 50
bordcom .8968254 .1117364 .6666667 1 50
leverage .5723616 .1707754 .0667531 .7869095 50
I
Firmsize 8.392455 .4274998 7.501~414973 50
womdir .0808921 .0515508 o .1428571 50
I I- ----'
Source: STA TA summery statistics result
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As presented in table 4.1, the average value of the sample insurance firms return on equity is
19.01 percent (mean=.1901528) and the maximum and minimum value of 49.97 and -15
percent respectively. It deviates by 11.83 percent from the mean value of the sample insurance
firms.
It is confirmed in the table above that the average board size for the sample insurance firms is
about 7 members (mean = 6.56) with a maximum of 9 and a minimum of 5 directors. This
means that the board sizes are appropriate for firm's optimum performance as evidenced by
Jensen (1993) and Lipton and Lorsch (1992) who stated that the bigger the board size, the less
effective it would mean for the firm performance. The standard deviation indicates that for the
sample insurance firms' board size varies by 1.14 from the average value of 6.56. The standard
deviation of 1.14 suggests that there is no wide dispersion in the board size of the sample
insurance firms.
On average, 8.08 percent (mean=.0808921) of the sample insurance firms directors are female
as measured by percentage of female directors divided by total number of directors, which is
considerably a disappointing figure. It suggests that the diversity of sample insurance firms
boards, as measured by proportion of directorship held by women, is low since its mean value
is only 8.08 percent during the last five years. The percentage of female directors in the sample
insurance companies is range from 0 (insurances do not have any representation for women on
their boards) to 14.28 percent representation with a standard deviation of 5 percent.
In terms of board composition the average, 89.7 percent (mean = .8968254) of the sample
insurance firms have independent/outside directors as measured by percentage independent
directors by total number of directors, which implies that most of the directors are independent
directors in the sample insurance firms. The maximum and minimum value of the board
composition is 100 and 66.6 percent respectively. It deviates by 11.17 percent from the mean
value of the sample insurance firms.
The mean value of firm size as measured by the natural logarithm of total asset is 8.39 with
having a maximum value of 9.4 and a minimum value of 7.5. The standard deviation of firm
size among the sample insurance firms is 42.74. On the other hand, the leverage of selected
insurance firms in Ethiopia is 57.23 percent on average as measured by debt to total asset with
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a range of 6.67 to 78 percent. The deviation is 17.1 percent, from the mean value of financial
leverage.
4.2 Correlation Analysis of the Study Variables
Correlation analysis is the statistical tool that can be utilized to determine the level of
association between two variables (Levin & Rubin, 1998). This analysis can be seen as the
initial step in statistical modelling to determine the relationship between the dependent and
independent variables. Prior to carrying out a multiple regression analysis, a correlation matrix
was developed to analyze the relationships between the independent variables as this would
assist in developing a prediction multiple model which will reveal no relationship in cases
where the value of the correlation is o. On the other hand, a correlation of ±1.0 means there is a
perfect positive or negative relationship (Hair et aI., 2010). The values are interpreted between
o (no relationship) and 1 (perfect relationship). Also, the relationship is considered small when
r = ±0.1 to ±0.29, while the relationship is considered medium when r = ±0.30 to ±0.49, and
when r is ±0.50 and above, the relationship can be considered strong. Below in table 4.2, the
correlation matrix which shows that the relationship of the return on equity with board size,
board composition, insurance firm size, board gender diversity and leverage with firm
performance (ROE).
Table 4.2 Correlation analysis of ROE and corporate governance mechanisms
-I roe Bordsiz womdir bordcom Leverage Firm size
roe 1.00
--
bordsiz -0.1138 1.00
womdir 0.2806 0.4489 1.00
bordcom 0.0587 0.2722 0.4480 1.00
Leverage 0.4697 -0.2467 -0.1077 0.1200 1.00
Firm size 0.2394 0.1284 -0.0057 -0.1014 -0.0826 1.00
Source: STAT A 11 correlation result based on the data obtained from sample insurance firms.
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Table 4.2 displays the correlations between the governance variables and control variables with
firm performance. These findings show that board size is negatively correlated (r= -0.11,
p>0.05) with ROE but not significant at the 0.05 level of significance.
In addition to that, the correlation between board gender diversity and ROE was positive but
not significant at the 0.05 level of significance (r= 0.280, p>0.05). Moreover, board
composition, firm size and leverage have positive but insignificant relationships with the ROE
at the 0.05 level of significance with coefficients (r=-0.058, p>0.05), (r=-0.2394, p>0.05) and
(r=-0.469, p>0.05) respectively. In sum, as evidenced by the above, it can be seen that one
variable has a negative correlation with ROE, namely board size. In contrast, four variables
have a positive correlation with ROE, board gender diversity, board composition, firm size and
leverage.
The outcomes present that there is no significant correlation among independent variables. A
maximum of a correlation coefficient of 0.45 is found via a correlation between a womdir and a
board's size. This indicates that the association between board size, board composition,
insurance firm size, board gender diversity and leverage shows a strong correlation with return
on equity and there is no significant correlation among the independent variables.
4.3 Diagnostic Tests of the Data Set
Before running the models, the data sets were tested for the classical linear regression model
assumptions (See appendix). Brooks (2008) suggests five critical assumptions that must be met
before utilizing GLS estimation in order to validly test the hypothesis and estimate the
coefficient. The classical linear regression model assumptions and their diagnostic tests are
discussed below.
4.3.1Test for Multi-collinearty
Gujarati (2004), stated that multi- collinearly is the presence of a "perfect," or exact, linear
relationship among some or all explanatory variables of a regression model. The researcher
used the VIF and tolerance to check whether there is the problem of multicollinearly or not
among the explanatory variables in the model.
37
Table 4.3 Test for multi-collinearity
variables VIF I/VIF
womdir 1.4 0.679149
bordsiz l.37 0.728332
bordcom 1.34 0.745842
leverage 1.12 0.894953
Firm size 1.04 0.962425
Mean ofVIF 1.27
Source: computed from STATA 11.0
The above table shows the relationship between each independent variable (board size, board
composition, insurance firm size, board gender diversity and leverage). A tolerance value (is an
indicator of how much of the variability of a specified independent variable is not explained by
the other independent variable) less than 0.1 and if the value of Variance Inflation Factor (VIF)
is above 10, indicate there is multicollinearty among the independent variables (Morgan et aI.,
2004). The result in the above table is obtained from the computation by STATA 1l.0 and
indicates that there are no tolerance values below 0.1 and the values of VIF greater than 10,
suggesting the model is free from multicollinearty problem. Therefore, all variables (board size,
board composition, insurance firm size, board gender diversity and leverage) can be retained in
the model.
4.3.2 Test for Heteroskedasticity
The next important assumption for classical linear regression model is that the disturbances
appearing in the population regression are homoskedastic that means the variance of the error
term is consistent. If errors do not have a constant variance (not homoscedastic), they are said
to be Hetroskedastic Brooks (2008).
To check the problem of hetroskedastisty, the researcher used Breusch Pagan test based on the
following null and alternative hypothesis
HO: there is no hetroskedasticty problem in the model
HI: there is hetroskedastisty problem in the model
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It is obtained from Breusch Pagan test that the p-value of 0.462 (see the Appendix) which is
unable to reject null hypothesis. So, that there is no hetroskedasticity problem.
4.3.3 Test for normality of Data
According to Gujarati (2004), before regression analysis is carried out, it should be noted that
there are some classic assumptions in undertaking the regression analysis and one of them is
normality of data. Therefore, normality test becomes relevant. Brooks (2008) also pointed out
that in order to conduct hypothesis test about the model parameter, the normality assumption
must be satisfied. The normality assumption is about the mean of the residuals is zero.
Accordingly the researcher used Shapiro- Wilk test for normal data.
Based on this test if the p-value is less than 0.05, then the null hypothesis that the data are
normally distributed is rejected. If the p-value is greater than 0.05, then the null hypothesis has
not been rejected.
4.3.3.1 Shapiro- Wilk test for normal data
HO:Data are normally distributed
HI: Data are not normally distributed
The Shapiro- Wilk test of the study provided the p-value of 0.18 that is greater than the p-value
of 0.05 (See the appendix). Hence, HO is not rejected that means the data are normally
distributed. The above test can be supported by figure as follows
Figure 4.1 Normal Probability Plot
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The above graph shows the normal distribution of residuals around its mean of zero. Hence the
normality assumption is fulfilled as required based on the above figure, it is possible to
conclude that the inferences that the researcher made about the population parameter from the
sample is valid.
The average value of the errors is zero. If a constant term is included in the regression
equation, this assumption will never be violated. So that in the model of this study a constant
term is included. As a result this assumption was not violated.
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4.3.4 Hausman Test: Fixed Effects versus Random Effects
The Hausman specification test compares the fixed versus random effects under the null
hypothesis that the individual effects are uncorrelated with the other regressors in the model
(Hausman 1978). If correlated (HO is rejected), a random effect model produces biased
estimators, violating one of the Gauss-Markov assumptions; so a fixed effect model is preferred.
The Hausman specification test provided the p-value of 0.0002 that is less than 0.05 (random
effect) (See the appendix). Meaning fixed effect model is not appropriate.
4.4 Model Determination
After considering the extent to which variables suffer from multicolleniarity, heteroskedasticity
and autocorrelation, a regression was conducted. Table 4.4 presents the regression outcomes
using the GLS Random effect method. Gujarati (1950) considers that the GLS random effect
method is very useful even if variables have heteroskedasticity and autocorrelation problems.
Table 4.4 Model determination
ROE Coef. Std. Err. T P>ltl [95% Conf. Interval]
BORDSIZ -.0208674 .0153422 l.36 0.174 -.0092026 .0509375
WOMDIR .9895228 .36777301 2.69 0.007* 1.710261 .268785
BORDCOM .0620814 .1502685 0.41 0.680 -.2324394 .3566022
LEVERAGE .3069861 .0901412 3.41 0.001 * .1303127 .4836596
FIRMSIZ .10032 .0346557 2.89 0.004* .0323961 .1682439
-cons -.9400076 .3444104 -2.73 0.006* -l.61504 -.2649755
--
R-sq: within = 0.1273 between = 0.8151 overall = 0.4156
*Significant at 1% level
Source: computed from STATA 1l.0
ROE=Po+PI*BOADSIZE+P2*BOADCOM+P3*LEVERAGE + P4*FIRMSIZ+~5*WOMDIR + c
ROE=-0.940-021 BOADSIZ+0.062BORDCOM+0.307LEVERAGE+0.l OFJRMSIZ+
0.99WOMDJR
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The model is regressed using random effects GLS linear regression analysis by STATA version
11 the regression results are presented in Table 4.4. Results indicate that there is no significant
relationship between board composition, board size and firm performances in either measure.
This implies that the outside independent directors and directors' size cannot influence firms'
financial performance. However, womdir, leverage and firm size has positive and significant
impact on the financial performance of Ethiopian insurance firms. On the other hand, a unit
increase in return on equity of firm's performances is the same to say as 98%, 30.6% and 10%
increases in womdir, leverage and firm size respectively.
The adjusted R square indicates how well the model variance has been explained (Morgan et al
2004). It is found that the adjusted R square of this model is 42% (see the Appendix), meaning
42% of the model is explained by the independent variables collectively (the dependent
variable, ROE, is explained by board size, board composition, insurance firm size, board
gender diversity and leverage) and the remaining is explained by other variables or factors.
4.5 Corporate Governance Mechanisms: Findings and Discussion
The regression result presented in the table 4.4 above shows that the p- value and t- value of
board size are 0.174 and 1.36 respectively indicating board size has no effect on ROE of
insurance industry in Ethiopia and it has a negative coefficient with return on equity. This
negative value indicates that the increase in board size causes the decrease of firm performance
measured by ROE. As per the result board size is insignificant, the reason might be the
similarity of the board size that the insurance companies have. This outcome is consistent with
the findings of Beiner et al. (2004), Bhagat and Black (2002) and Limpaphayom and Connelly
(2006) but not consistent with the findings of Yermack (1996) and Shakir (2008). Therefore,
the first hypothesis that there is a strong negative relationship between board size and ROE of
insurance industry in Ethiopia is rejected.
The relationship between board gender diversity (WOMDIR) and financial performance
measures are significant and it has a positive coefficient with return on equity. The p- value and
t- value of board gender diversity are 0.007 and 2.69 respectively indicating board gender
diversity has effect on ROE on insurance firms in Ethiopia. The positive value indicates that the
higher the value of the board gender diversity, the higher the firm performance (ROE). The
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percentage of female directors in the sample insurance industries range from 0 (insurances do
not have any representation of women on their boards) to 14.28 percent representation, which
means the percentage of female in the board of directors are very small and for future they may
give attention to increase the percentage of females in the board of director because of it has a
positive impact on firm performance of the insurance firms. Smith and Verner (2005),
Welbourne's (1999) and Carter, Simkins and Simpson (2003) report that the proportion of
women in top management has a positive impact on firm performance.
In relation to board composition, the relationship between firm performance (ROE) and board
composition of selected insurance firms of Ethiopia is insignificant, because the p- value and t-
value of board composition is 0.680 and 0.41 respectively, and it has a positive coefficient with
return on equity and which means board composition has insignificant effect on firm
performance of Ethiopian insurance firms based on return on equity. The positive value
indicates that the higher the value of the board composition, the higher the firm performance
(ROE). This outcome is consistent with the findings of Staikouras et al. (2007), Bhagat and
Black (2002) and De Andres et al. (2005) found no significant relationship between the
composition of the board and firm performance. Therefore, the second hypothesis that there is a
positive relationship between board composition and ROE of insurance industry in Ethiopia is
rejected but it has a positive impact on ROE.
The regression results on table 4.4 also shows that leverage (LEVERAGE) has significant
positive influence on insurance firms performance measured by return on equity (p-value<
0.05) which has the p-value and t- value of 0.001 and 3.41 respectively and it has positive
coefficient with return on equity. It implies that an increase in the debt position is associated
with increase in performance. The result indicates that insurance firms with higher levels of
debt as a proportion of equity is to perform better than those having lower proportion of debt.
According to the agency theory, the monitoring provided by debt financing reduces
management's incentive to misuse free cash flows, and consequently leads to a better firm
performance. The finding is consistent with the literature and with some studies conducted
earlier (Khatab, et aI., 2011; Sanda et aI., 2005; Babatunde & a laniran, 2009. Habbash, 2010)
also argues that highly leveraged firms are found to be less involved in fraudulent practices.
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Therefore, the third hypothesis that there is a positive relationship between insurance leverage
and ROE of insurance industry in Ethiopia is accepted.
Consistent with the hypothesis, the firm size of the insurance firms is observed to be positively
related to return on equity and statistically significant at the 1 percent level. The finding is also
consistent with the studies by Shiu (2004), Chen and Wong (2004) and Browne, Carson and
Hoyt (2001) who find positive relationship between size and financial performance of
companies. The result supports the basis for economies of scale, whereby larger companies are
more likely to perform better as they can achieve operating cost efficiency through increasing
output and economizing on the unit cost of production and process development. When the
firm is large, it is more likely to have broader activities, production range, value creation
sources and influence on the market (Bohren, 2005).
Table 4.5 summary of the hypothesis result
Hypothesis Relationship Result Decision
--
HI Board size and ROE Negative Rejected
insignificant
--
H2 Board composition and ROE Positive Rejected
insignificant
H3 Leverage and ROE Positive Accepted
significant -IH4 Firm size and ROE Positive Accepted
significant
H5 Board gender diversity and Positive Accepted
ROE significant
Source: computed from STATA 11
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CHAPTER FIVE
CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS
The previous chapter contained the data analysis and the findings of the study. This chapter
contains the conclusions drawn and the recommendations given based on the major findings in
the previous chapter.
5.1 Conclusion
The study examines the relationship between corporate governance mechanisms and firm
performance for the period of five years from the year 2008 to 2012. The researcher drawn the
following conclusions based on the result of the data analysis.
Return on equity (ROE) used to determine the financial performance of insurance industry in
Ethiopia proxied by net income to average total assets.
The researcher found that board gender diversity, leverage and firm size have a positive effect
on ROE and significant where as board size and board composition have negative effect and
positive effect respectively on ROE but they have insignificant effect on ROE of selected
insurance firms in Ethiopia.
Based on the descriptive statistics the financial performance of sample insurance firms are
19.01 percent as measured by return on equity (ROE). It is therefore the sample insurance firms
are performing better in utilizing shareholders capital. The sample insurance firms board
composition is characterized by the presence of majority independent directors but, the board is
dominated by male and the coverage of women's in the board of directors are only 8.1 percent
in selected insurance firms of Ethiopia. In particular, this study finds that female board
members represent a diversification of board's membership and this diversified nature will
contribute positively to firm's performance.
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The correlation analysis indicates that most of the corporate governance mechanisms
significantly correlated with the financial performance of selected Ethiopian insurance firms.
Board gender diversity significantly and positively influence the financial performance of
selected insurance firms. The presence of women directors in the board is very small. Only 8.1
percent of the board members are females in the sample insurance firms of Ethiopia. Therefore
the role of women's in the board or top position of insurance industry of Ethiopia is very much
limited.
Board composition and board size are insignificant to the financial performance of selected
insurance firms (ROE). Board composition has a positive impact and board size have a
negative impact on financial performance of sample insurance firms. Thus, small board size is
effective to improve financial performance of insurance firms. As per the result, board
composition and board size are insignificant to the financial performance of Ethiopian
insurance industry. The reason of this result might be, in our country context the external
directors are not 100% independent, because in all of the insurance companies these external
directors owns the share of that particular company. On the other hand the insignificance of
board size might come from the similarity of the board size that all the insurance companies
have. Because of this identifying the impact of board size and board composition on firm
performance will be difficult.
Firm sizes significantly and positively influence the financial performance of sample insurance
firms measured by return on equity (ROE). Therefore, high firm size is effective to improve
financial performance of sample insurance firms. When the firm is large, it is more likely to
have broader activities, production range, value creation sources and influence on the market
(Bohren, 2005). Hardwick (1997) argues that there is a positive relationship between
performance and size due to operating cost efficiencies through increasing output and
economizing on unit of cost. Large corporate size also enables insurers to effectively diversify
their assumed risks and respond more quickly to changes in market conditions.
Leverage significantly and positively influence the financial performance of sample insurance
firms measured by return on equity (ROE). It implies that an increase in the debt position is
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associated with increase in performance. This indicates Ethiopian insurance companies have
higher debt potential so, they can use this potential in order to increase their profitability.
Finally, the findings suggest that insurance firms with effective corporate governance
mechanisms improve financial performance depending on the financial performance measure
being used. Although not all corporate governance variables support the stated hypotheses, the
study has achieved its objective by identifying the attributes that help to test the research
hypotheses. This study, therefore, finds that agency theory offers a generally good explanation
of the associations between corporate governance mechanisms with financial performance.
5.2 Recommendations
Based on the findings and conclusions reached, the following recommendations were
forwarded .
./ It is revealed that involving higher number of women in corporate top position or in the
board of directors is related to increased performance of firms. Hence, the study
recommended that the Ethiopian insurance industry encourage women to participate in
corporate top position or in the board of directors .
./ This study revealed that large firm size is related to increase performance of insurance
firms. Thus, the study recommended that attention should be given to increase total
asset of the insurance firms to improve performance .
./ Finally it is revealed that leverage is related to increase financial performance of
insurance firms. Thus, the study recommended that attention should be given to the
better utilizing of debt potential.
5.3 Future Research Directions
Due to the earlier discussed limitations, future research could follow various avenues of
research to better explain the corporate governance and firm performance relationship. First,
future research could attempt to explore the nature of these relationships in other financial
companies and unselected companies as well employing different methods and employing the
data for longer periods to explore the long-term behavior of such relationships.
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Second, further studies on the subject can also be extended to include various aspects of board
characteristics and explore board processes such as remuneration and nominating committees,
board of director's frequency of meetings and experience on board of directors.
Last but not least, future studies should attempt to investigate the integrated effect of internal
and external corporate governance factors on the firms' performance to clarify the potential
causes of enhanced performance to attract more capital and generate wealth. Moreover, the
effect of the ownership structure with board structure on the firm performance should be
considered in the future research.
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APPENDICES
Appendix I: Diagnostic tests results for GLS Assumptions
1. Ramsey Reset test
Ramsey RESE.' test usin~ powers of he fittea values of roe
Ho: model has no omittea variables
F(j, H) = U~
~rob > F = um
Source: computed from stata 11.0
2. Durbin Watson test
~urbin-Watson statistic (ori~inal) 1,mm
~urbin-Watson statistic (transformed) L, mm
Source: computed from stata 11.0
3. Brush-Pagan heteroskedasticity test
~reuscn-~a~an I CooHeisber~ test for heteroskedasticit~
Ho: Constant variance
Variables: fitted values of roe
chiL (1) = U~
~rob > chiL ~,~m
Source: computed from stata 11.0
4. Brush and pagan lagrangian test
Breusch and Pagan Lagrangian multiplier test for random effects
roe Icompany It J = Xb t u Icompany J tel company It J
Estimated results:
roe .0139986 .1183158
.0063967 .0799792
.0024425 .0494217
Var sd = sqrt (Var)
Test: Var (u) = 0
chibar2(0l) = 0.50
Prob > chibar2 = 0.2396
Source: computed from stata 11.0
5. Shapiro- Wilk W test for normal data
variable observation W V Z Prob>z
ROE 50 0.96712 1.546 0.929 0.17636
Source: computed from stata 11.0
6. Fixed effect regression
Roe Coef. Std.err. z p>lzl
bordsiz -.108599 .0754053 -1.44 0.159
womdir .1214738 .4803124 0.25 0.802
bordcom -.3720921 .7362953 -0.51 0.616
leverage .. 0193468 .2604158 0.07 0.941
firmsize .3676124 .0782426 4.70 0.000
--
-cons -1.869806 .8331451 -2.24 0.031
---R2 6.48%
.---.J
Source: computed from stata 11.0
7. Random effect GLS regression
----
Roe Coef. Std.err. z p>lzl
bordsiz -.0208674 .0153422 1.36 0.174
womdir .9895228 .3677301 2.69 0.007
bordcom .0620814 .1502685 0.41 0.680
leverage .3069861 .0901412 3.41 0.001
firmsize .10032 .0346557 2.89 0.004
-cons -.9400076 .3444104 -2.73 0.006
R2 42%
Source: computed from stata 11.0
8. Hawsman fixed effect versus random effect test
(h) (B) (b-B) sqrt(diag(V"_b~
I
fixed random difference V_B)) I
I
S.E. I
bordsiz -.108599 -.0208674 -.1294665 .073828
womdir .1214738 .9895228 1.110997 .3089896
bordcom -.3720921 .0620814 -.4341735 .7207983
leverage .0193468 .3069861 -.2876393 .2443173
firmsize .3676124 .10032 .2672924 .070149
b = consistent under Ho and Ha; obtained from xtreg
B = inconsistent under Ha, efficient under Ho; obtained from xtreg
Test: Ho: difference in coefficients not systematic
chi2 (5) = (b-B)'[(V _b-V_BY'(-1)](b-B) = 24.24
Prob>chi2 = 0.0002
Source: computed from ST/\ TA 11.
Appendix II: List of Sample Insurance Firms
S.No Insurance companies Year of establishment
-I. *Abay insurance company 2010
2. Africa Insurance Company s.c. 1994
3. Awash Insurance Company S.C 1994
4. *Berhan insurance S.c 2011
5. *Ethio-Life and General Insurance S.c. 2008
--
6. Ethiopian Insurance Corporation 1975
..
7. Global Insurance Company S.C. 1997
8. Lion Insurance Company S.C 2007
9. National Insurance Company of Ethiopia S.C. 1994
10. I Nib Insurance C mpany 2002
II. Nile Insurance ( ompany S.C 1995
12. Nyala Insurance Company S.C 1995
13. *Oromia lnsurai .ce Company s.c. 2009
14. . *Tsehay Insurance S.C. 2012
15. The United Insurance S.C 1997
Note: * insurance companies not selected for the study
Source: http://www.nbe.gO\.et/financiallinsurer.htm
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